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UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW THROUGH THE LENS OF REASON 
Gardner, John. 2007. Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 288pp. 
François Tanguay-Renaud* 
In 1968, H.L.A. Hart, who was then in his last year as Professor of Jurisprudence at the 
University of Oxford, published a collection of his past essays on criminal law theory 
which he complemented with a postscript (Hart 1968). Four decades later, his most recent 
successor in title, John Gardner, offers us a similarly organised compilation—Offences 
and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law—in which a Reply to 
Critics is substituted for the postscript. Hart’s collection is widely acknowledged as one 
of his foremost contributions to the philosophy of law and, to this day, remains one of the 
foundational texts in criminal law theory. In Offences and Defences, John Gardner carries 
the Oxonian torch admirably in terms of both depth and innovation. He provides us with 
a remarkably rich, coherent and thought-provoking set of arguments that will no doubt 
join Hart’s among the classic starting-points for philosophical inquiry about the criminal 
law. 
I say that Gardner’s collection is remarkably coherent since the arguments 
presented build on each other quite seamlessly, despite having been committed to print 
over a period of thirteen years. Perhaps even more impressively, they also cohere, by and 
large, with the rest of Gardner’s extensive body of work. Like Hart, Gardner is a theorist 
of many talents who, over the last twenty years, has had much to say about many other 
philosophical questions—most notably, about issues in tort theory, general jurisprudence, 
and moral theory. The essays in Offences and Defences constitute only a segment of a 
larger intellectual project that seeks to theorise criminal law and tort law by 
understanding each in relation to the other, as well as in light of more general 
jurisprudential and moral insights. That this dimension of Gardner’s project may not be 
readily apparent to a casual reader of his book is understandable, given his decision not to 
include a number of key essays that make some of these more holistic connections clearer 
(e.g., Gardner 1998, 2005). That being said, the alert eye will readily recognize Gardner-
the-exclusive-legal-positivist who argues that the criminal law ‘unexcludes’ otherwise 
purportedly cancelled reasons for actions when it grants justification defences (148). 
Gardner-the-liberal-perfectionist is also omnipresent, as reflected in many of his 
conceptual and critical takes on the internal structure, functions, and proper scope of the 
criminal law. However, it is Gardner-the-rationalist (and, some might add, the 
committed-moral-realist) who gives the collection its most distinctive tone. 
Granting, like many before him, that the legitimacy of the criminal law quite 
centrally depends on its sensitivity to its subjects’ blameworthiness (with ‘fault’ and 
‘culpability’ often used as synonyms),1 Gardner defines the concept as follows: ‘To be 
*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Thanks are owed to Victor Tadros for helpful comments.
1 In Gardner’s words, ‘by punishing people in proportion to their crimes, where those crimes are mapped 
according to the action that made them wrongful adjusted for the offender’s blameworthiness in respect of 
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blameworthy,’ he writes, ‘one must: (a) have done something wrong and (b) have been 
responsible for doing it, while lacking (c) justification and (d) excuse for having done it’ 
(227). Much of Offences and Defences consists in a conceptual elucidation of variables 
(a) to (d) and their interrelations. For Gardner, the criminal law story begins with 
wrongdoing, which he defines as an ‘action in breach of duty’ (253) – or, as he clarifies 
elsewhere, an action in breach of a reason that is both categorical and mandatory in that it 
‘(i) does not depend for its existence on one’s goals at the time, and (ii) is also a reason 
not to act for certain conflicting reasons’ (Gardner and Macklem 2002, p. 465). This 
preliminary step is crucial in Gardner’s thought and grounds his rejection of conceptions 
of ‘blameworthiness at large, or blameworthiness tout court’ that are solely dependent on 
‘how things seemed to us at the time of our action’ (229-230). Wrongdoing is, at least in 
part, action that does not conform to reason, as assessed from an agent-neutral 
perspective. It is of this wrongdoing (either principal or accessorial), objectively 
understood, that we can then ask whether it was perpetrated by a responsible agent, and 
whether she had any justifications or excuses for perpetrating it.2 Of course, to be 
legitimate, the criminal law needs to tailor its definition of the wrongs it criminalizes: to 
provide its addressees with adequate guidance and warning (the ‘rule of law’ constraint), 
to prevent harm (the ‘harm principle’ constraint), and to conform to any other 
requirements that morality may impose on it in virtue of its institutional claim to 
authority, its characteristic resort to coercion, or otherwise. In Chapters One, Two, and 
Three, and in the first two sections of the Reply to Critics, Gardner has much to say about 
ways in which the criminal law may optimally comply with such constraints. For 
example, he argues that the law should endeavour to define crimes in ‘action-specific’ 
terms (55, 240-241), that textual clarity should be carefully balanced with a concern for 
moral clarity (43-53), and that criminal prohibitions should, at least indirectly, serve to 
prevent harm (proportionately and effectively) (29-32, 242). That said, these discussions 
are all grounded in an understanding of legitimately criminalized wrongdoing as actual 
wrongdoing—that is, a breach of an actual duty legitimately recognized (malum in se) or 
created (malum prohibitum) by the criminal law (239). 
Not all variables in Gardner’s account of blameworthiness (fault, culpability) are 
to be assessed from an exclusively agent-neutral perspective. Yet, all are to be understood 
them, the court contributes decisively to the affirmation of the offender’s humanity which is a sine qua non 
of the legitimacy of any modern State punishment’ (233). As he emphasises in the postscript (282-283), it 
is really criminal law as a whole that he has in mind here, since, according to him, ‘the criminal law is only 
secondarily a vehicle for […] punishment. It is primarily a vehicle for the public identification of 
wrongdoing (by standards of evidence and procedure) and for responsible agents, whose wrongs have been 
thus identified, to answer for their wrongs by offering justifications and excuses for having committed 
them’ (80) and, thus, establish that they are not blameworthy (faulty, culpable). 
2 Gardner also speaks, without much detail or nuance, of ‘fault-anticipating wrongs’ that are only 
committed by responsible agents who lack (certain) justifications or excuses for what they do (150-153). 
However, since these more complex wrongs are generally parasitic on more basic ‘strict wrongs’ whose 
commission is not contingent on their perpetrator’s blameworthiness, their existence does not undermine 
his basic categorization. Of course, I do not mean to imply here that Gardner could not usefully say more 
about these ‘frequently’-encountered fault-anticipating wrongs. A discussion of the relationship between 
the various breaches of justificatory or excusatory standards that can partly constitute them and the range of 
mental-state requirements typically encountered in the formulation of both criminal law offences and moral 
wrongs would perhaps be most welcome. 
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at least partly in relation to the realm of reason characterized as such. Take element (c), 
for example, which, for Gardner, depends in part on how things seemed to the agent at 
the time of action and in part on how things actually were. Wrongdoing is justifiable, 
Gardner argues, if the reasons in favour of it are not defeated—that is, if they are not 
prohibited by the criminal law in the case of criminal justifications, and are not defeated, 
all things considered, in the case of moral justifications (which, Gardner assumes, legal 
justifications ought, by and large, to reflect). However, an agent’s wrongdoing is justified 
only if he acts for one or more of those undefeated reasons for action (95-108).3  Failing 
to act for such reasons tends to reflect badly upon one—that is, it tends to constitute one’s 
blameworthiness—as a rational agent (and, implicitly, given the kind of reasons at stake, 
as a moral agent).  
I say ‘tends to’ reflect badly upon one as a rational agent, because an agent who 
fails the test of justification may then retreat to element (d), the excuse element, to resist 
an allegation of blameworthiness. Indeed, an agent who acts wrongfully on the basis of a 
reasonable error in cognition or a reasonable affective distortion of his practical thinking 
may well not be worthy of any blame. So, here again, it matters what predicament the 
agent took himself to be in. However, it also matters whether there were actual 
undefeated reasons of a different kind—i.e., reasons for belief, for emotion, for attitude, 
etc.—that made the way in which the agent interpreted his predicament reasonable (108-
113). Only then does it make sense to think that the agent’s unjustified wrongful action 
should not reflect badly on him—i.e., that he is not worthy of blame – as a rational agent. 
True, says Gardner, any rational agent, given the choice, would rather be justified than 
excused. It is better to act for an undefeated reason than to be drawn, even for an 
undefeated reason, into acting for a defeated one. But this is not because wrongdoing 
while fully excused reflects badly upon one as a rational agent. For Gardner, ‘the gist of 
an excuse’ is precisely that one’s action, although wrong, lived up to the expectations of 
reasonableness befitting the particular role(s) that the agent was playing at the time, be it 
that of a police officer, a soldier or, perhaps more controversially, a simple human being 
(121-139). The difference is that justification brings one closer than excuse to perfect 
success as a rational being—that is, success not only in terms of one’s cognitive or 
emotional interpretation of the world, but also in one’s practical responses to it. That said, 
Gardner stresses: that ‘one falls short of perfect success as a rational being need not be 
one’s fault’ if the failure does not reveal unfitness for one’s relevant role(s) (272).  
This emphasis on rationality—which, to some, may seem overstated in Gardner’s 
account of blameworthiness—takes its roots in his understanding of who, in the first 
place, can intelligibly be called to answer (criminally or, more generally, morally) for 
wrongdoing. Gardner’s position, encapsulated in element (b), is that an agent must be 
responsible in the sense of being response-able. ‘Responsibility in the basic sense,’ he 
writes, ‘is none other than an ability to offer justifications and excuses’ for wrongdoing 
(182). It is ‘the ability to explain oneself, to give an intelligible account of oneself, to 
3 To be sure, Gardner’s account of this agent-perspectival aspect of justifications in terms of ‘how things 
seemed to the agent at the time of action’ (227) can be misleading. As his work otherwise makes clear, it is 
motivation and not mere perception that matters for justification. Although the two ideas are intimately 
related in that perception generally influences motivation, mere perception is insufficient. 
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answer for oneself, as a rational being.’ This basic ability to respond to reason must be 
differentiated from another sense of ‘being responsible for what was done,’ which means 
bearing the adverse normative consequences of its having been done. In fact, basic 
responsibility ‘is normally, and certainly in any legitimate criminal court, a precondition 
of responsibility in [this second consequential] sense’ (131). Its value is primarily 
intrinsic and ‘is instantiated, rather than instrumentally served by, the criminal process’ 
(188-191). It ‘forms part of the case for my being responsible (accountable) to someone’ 
(277) for wrongdoing, which, in the criminal law context, must then be complemented by 
the other elements of blameworthiness (alongside broader considerations of legitimacy 
and standing). In its absence, the criminal law, which is primarily concerned with our 
conformity with certain (moral) reasons, should generally refrain from even considering 
the possibility of blaming—be it by condemning, punishing, or any of their cognates.4 
 
 As Gardner himself acknowledges in the preface, many lines of thought advanced 
in the collection, including the ones just introduced, have been subject to extensive and 
formidable criticisms. Many such criticisms are discussed in the Reply to Critics and, 
despite Gardner’s insistence that he has ‘not had cause to disown any of the lines of 
thought assembled here’ (vii), it soon becomes clear to the reader that a number of his 
arguments demand—and, often, lay valuable foundations for—further inquiry in what 
tend to be difficult philosophical terrains. For instance, what does it mean to act 
(justifiedly) for an undefeated reason? Gardner tells us that reasons are facts, but are risks 
facts? In response to Victor Tadros’s claim that there are facts about what will happen in 
the future—such as objective risks—as well as facts about how the world is now, 
Gardner questions the very possibility of present reasons about the future. As a result, his 
view of justification focuses on ‘present tense’ cases, such that ‘D has a reason to run 
away only if he is indeed going to be attacked’ (258). However, aren’t many cases of 
justified self-defence cases where the attacker could possibly have turned away before 
injuring her victim, and was really only posing a risk to his life and limb, as tangible and 
imminent as it may have been, at the time of the defensive action? Gardner does not 
account for such ‘future tense’ cases in argument except by suggesting, in a question-
begging fashion, that they may lie on the borderline between justification and excuse. 
This criticism can be sharpened by noting that Gardner’s own example of D who ‘is 
going to be attacked’ seems more oriented towards the future than the present. It may be 
that D only has a reason to run away if he is being attacked—a more clearly ‘present 
tense’ kind of case. However, when pressed, this view appears rather implausible. What 
if, at a given point in time, D is unmistakably being attacked, but the attack has no 
likelihood of being realized—say, because the attacker is about to be knocked 
unconscious by a speeding motorist? Is D justified in running away? To the extent that he 
is not—i.e., the more intuitive answer and the one that, all else being equal, I believe 
Gardner would give—it must either be because the attack will not be realized, or because, 
at the relevant point in time, it is too unlikely to be realized. If, as Gardner claims, 
justification depends on present facts, we are then back at square one, confronted with the 
                                                 
4 The criminal law may, however, be justified in bringing non-responsible wrongdoers with mental health 
problems ‘into contact with those who can treat their condition’ (215). Insofar as the criminal law has any 
justification, Gardner insists, it is likely not a unitary one. 
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daunting task of deciding whether risks are facts and, if so, how we should specify what 
risks there are in fact.   
 
On a different, though related, note, it also seems as though Gardner does not take 
the possibility of mixed motives seriously enough.5 What if a scrupulously law-abiding 
self-defender is motivated to resort to proportionate force against an attacker partly for 
the reason that he is being attacked, but also partly because he thinks, based on 
previously publicised judicial decisions, that the law would not condemn or punish such 
behaviour? Is he justified in acting as such? Or, what if somebody engages in the traffic 
of hard drugs in response to a reasonable fear that his supplier will hurt him if he doesn’t, 
but also because he thinks that the criminal law and society at large do not expect him to 
resist such a threat of harm? Should he be excused? Gardner’s position on such matters is 
perhaps exceedingly clear-cut. ‘To attempt to benefit from a legal excuse by being guided 
by it,’ he writes, ‘is to forfeit that excuse’ (138). He also states that anyone ‘who sees a 
justificatory legal rule for what it really is will know that it cannot in itself motivate 
action in accordance with it since it gives no reasons for action’ (115). One wonders 
whether his position would remain as firm if he explicitly attended to a wider array of 
cases where one of the reasons relied upon is undefeated and, arguably, sufficient to 
justify or excuse wrongdoing, while others, such as what the law has to say about the 
justifications and excuses it recognizes, are not. Examples of non-legal mixed motives 
may help sharpen the point. What if our self-defender happened to resent his attacker and 
was also quite happy to injure him and give him his ‘just desert’ when resorting to 
necessary and proportionate force in self-defence?6 Or, what if the man trading drugs 
under duress lived up to relevant expectations of fortitude when giving in to the threat, 
yet was in dire financial straights and was also somewhat driven by the lure of money? I 
believe that, if pressed, Gardner may be willing to concede that the self-defender was 
justified—since he acted at least in part for an undefeated reason—and the drug dealer 
was at least partially excused—since he did live up to the relevant standard of fortitude 
applicable in the circumstances. Thus, Gardner’s reluctance to extend such recognition to 
cases of mixed moral and legal motives in the justificatory and excusatory contexts is 
somewhat puzzling. In fact, his contention that mistaken but reasonable beliefs in 
justification ground excuses accentuates the awkwardness of his position. Consider cases 
in which reliance on the possibility of such an excuse makes all the difference as to 
whether one is willing to respond—say, in self-defence—to what reasonably seems 
(although one is not sure) to be an undefeated reason—say, a culpable attack—but, as it 
turns out, is not. Should that would-be self-defender really be denied an excuse of 
reasonable mistake in justification because he partially relied on it at the time of action?   
 
                                                 
5 This lack of attention comes despite Gardner’s recent unambiguous acknowledgement that it is possible to 
act for genuinely mixed motives (Gardner 2007a, p. 2620). 
6 This might be one of the ‘rare cases’ of justification that Gardner himself alludes to when he writes: ‘That 
people are inclined to retaliate against those who wrong them, often with good excuse but rarely with 
adequate justification, creates pressure for social practices which tend to take the heat out of the situation 
and remove some of the temptation to retaliate, eliminating in the process some of the basis for excusing 
those who do so’ (213-214). The puzzle introduced in the text highlights the need for further exploration of 
the relationship between self-defence, revenge, punishment, and criminal law that Gardner begins to 
unearth in the passages surrounding this quotation and in the last sections of the Reply to Critics.  
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A colleague recently suggested to me a further example that, in her view, 
bolstered this line of criticism. Would the police officer monitoring speed on the highway 
be justified in stopping one speeding motorist out of many for the reason that she dislikes 
the colour of his car?7 Here, the motorist’s excess speed seems to justify the detention, 
regardless of the officer’s additional motive in stopping him and regardless of the fact 
that one of her reasons for stopping him is provided by the law. This example is clearly 
interesting, but mainly, I think, for a different reason. As Gardner himself recognizes, 
there are special cases in which legal officials like police officers must act upon a legal 
rule requiring them to perform certain actions—e.g., a temporary detention, an arrest—if 
these actions are to count ‘as fully justified in law’ (116). Some critiques have recently 
attempted to use this apparent discrepancy in his thought to undermine his account of 
justification (e.g., Thorburn 2008). However, in Gardner’s defence, he is careful to point 
out that while criminal law justifications are always permissions to act for otherwise 
excluded reasons, they may sometimes be combined with role-specific legal duties. Here, 
one could also point out that the actions of legal officials are typically bounded by an 
additional type of rule—i.e., power-conferring rules—that confers legal validity on some 
of their actions. While stopping short of clarifying this further layer of complications and 
addressing the multifaceted interface between criminal law and public law in Offences 
and Defences, Gardner at least makes sure to highlight in passing the complexity of cases 
of official action, leaving himself enough room to continue developing his account 
gradually and systematically in future work.8  
 
This methodological remark is important. While some have criticized Gardner for 
leaving key issues that his work raises unaddressed, it is in fact one of the great strengths 
of his style of argument. Gardner’s work often looks beneath the surface of philosophical 
puzzles and arguments that have bogged down theorists for generations. This courageous 
approach often yields powerful insights, but also carries with it the constant threat of 
derailing his trends of thought by opening interesting new paths of inquiry along the way. 
Fortunately, Gardner is a thinker who tends to be careful not to move too fast and ride 
roughshod over deep puzzles. He generally says enough to generate novel and fruitful 
debate and, when challenged, rarely shies away from clarifying his claims in later work. 
Admittedly, his Reply to Critics sometimes raises more questions than it provides 
answers. For example, challenges to the soundness of his conception of ‘result crimes’—
i.e., crimes committed by making a certain causal contribution to a certain outcome—on 
the ground that it neglects the possibility of outcome luck are met with question marks: 
‘We have just been scratching the surface of the question of whether result crimes should 
exist,’ he writes, but ‘if result crimes should exist, what causal contribution must one 
make to the result before one commits them?’ (248). Challenges to key aspects of his 
defence of agent-neutralism and of its implications for a sound understanding of wrongful 
complicity are also met with the timid concession that he ‘did not mount a full defence of 
                                                 
7 This example, brought to my attention by Kimberley Brownlee, is a variant on a scenario deployed for 
different purposes in Nathanson (1985).  
8 On this point, see his recent ‘Justification under Authority’. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
(forthcoming), available online at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345763. 
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this agent-neutralist view’ (278).9 With Gardner, however, these gaps in argument are 
most likely to be indications that further work on these topics is forthcoming, along the 
lines of his recent discussion of the polemical claim made in Chapter Five (120-122) and 
reiterated without more in the Reply to Critics (258) that all conceptually-sound and 
legitimate excuses—including emotional excuses—must be understood in terms of the 
successful achievement of relevant standards of rationality.10   
  
Thus, it seems fitting to conclude with a call for further elaboration on one of the 
important conundrums as yet ignored by critics, discussants, and reviewers of Gardner’s 
work. As I noted above, at the root of Gardner’s conception of blameworthiness lies the 
idea of responsibility qua response-ability for one’s wrongs. Without it, assessments of 
blameworthiness cannot even get off the ground. Gardner insists that responsibility in this 
basic sense has a primarily intrinsic value: it is ‘a distinctively human capacity’ and one 
whose affirmation and recognition ‘is central to all distinctively human lives’ (276). The 
point I wish to make here is that, as intuitively plausible as it may seem, this way of 
understanding basic responsibility and its importance fails to account for corporate action 
and responsibility—oft-encountered ideas in both criminal law and moral realms. 
 
Some theorists—of whom Philip Pettit is perhaps the most sophisticated—offer 
spirited defences of the claim that corporate agents can be irreducibly responsible (qua 
response-able) for their wrongs.11 To be sure, Pettit argues, quite persuasively, that any 
sound account of irreducibly responsible group agents must recognize that all their matter 
and energy is derived from what their individual human members supply. Such group 
agents, insofar as there are any, are not ontologically distinct creatures, and should not be 
mysteriously theorized as such. Such recognition would allow Gardner, were he to go 
down this argumentative path,12 to preserve his idea of basic responsibility as a 
distinctively human capacity in the context of corporate agency, even if, in some such 
contexts, it could not simply be reduced to distinct human beings. That being said, it is 
much more debatable whether irreducible corporate responsibility, insofar as there is such 
a thing, can intelligibly be described as intrinsically valuable. And even if it were 
                                                 
9 In fact, it sometimes seems as though, on the issue of agent-neutralism, Gardner’s most basic assumptions 
are insufficiently probed. For example, he seems to think that only an agent-relativist would regard killing 
one person to prevent five people from being killed as wrong (58-66). However, this assumption is 
incorrect (e.g., Kamm 1996, ch.10).  
10 Gardner, John. The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 
(forthcoming), available online at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261764. 
11 For a systematic presentation of Pettit’s position, see especially Pettit (2007). In short, Pettit argues that 
some groups acting under adequate normative frameworks are relatively autonomous agents that may be in 
positions to act wrongfully, have the understanding and the access to evidence required for making 
judgments of value, and have the control required for being able to respond appropriately to these 
judgments. See also French (1984). 
12 In a recent essay, Gardner claims that corporate organizations such as some state institutions can 
conceivably be agents whose agency is irreducible to the agency of their individual human members 
(Gardner 2007b, pp. 57-60). Of course, this claim leaves open the possibility that such irreducible corporate 
agents may not be rational and moral agents, but other recent comments of his seem to pre-empt this 
argumentative strategy. ‘States,’ he writes, ‘are moral agents too […] The state must not murder or be 
complicit in murder. It must not rape or be complicit in rape. It must not rob or be complicit in robbery’ 
(Gardner 2007a, p. 2628). This contention seems only one short step away from the claim that states and, 
possibly, other corporate agents can be irreducibly responsible (qua response-able) for their wrongs. 
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possible to make a sound case that it can intrinsically enrich human life, its primary 
value—just like the primary value of the corporate organizations that instantiate it—
would no doubt be instrumental. For example, insofar as the idea of basic corporate 
responsibility is sound and, as a result, corporate entities can be worthy of blame for their 
wrongdoing, the criminal law might then legitimately be able to hold them 
consequentially responsible when all human beings involved are excused (say, because of 
the uneven flow of information throughout the organization) or too remotely connected to 
the wrong(s) in question. The intuition underlying this premise of instrumentality is 
powerful: an assertion of basic corporate responsibility differs significantly from an 
individual’s affirmation of her humanity through an assertion of her basic ability to 
respond to reason. For one, such an assertion is unavoidably relational—a dimension 
which Gardner emphatically excludes from his understanding of basic individual 
responsibility (164-166). Yet, to the extent that some corporate agents have the 
irreducible ability to respond appropriately to reason, they may be said to be basically 
responsible in a non-negligible sense that Gardner would need to explain. 
 
Since, as we have seen, Gardner thinks that an agent’s blameworthiness is partly 
constituted by the agent’s basic responsibility, he would then also need to explain how 
the differences between individual and corporate basic responsibility affect his 
conception of blameworthiness—a conception which, in Offences and Defences, he 
presents as unitary. Along similar lines, one may wonder whether irreducibly responsible 
corporate agents could offer excuses for wrongdoing like their individual counterparts, 
given their lack of self-interest, affective experience, and so forth. Here, it is noteworthy 
that Gardner admits in Chapter Eight that sound claims of individual excuses may vary 
depending on the ‘social milieu’ in relation to which they are made (159-162). He also 
appreciates that the contours of the roles that shape excusatory standards may be at least 
partly socially contingent (167-172). Thus, he recognizes that individual excuses have at 
least some ‘collective’ dimensions. He may even be ready to grant that such dimensions 
can be accentuated in the context of more formally constituted corporate organizations. 
However, it remains to be seen whether he would be willing to defend the possibility of 
irreducibly corporate excuses. 
 
Of course, Gardner may seek to avoid such difficult questions by arguing that 
basic corporate responsibility is merely a useful fiction that, at times, may be justifiedly 
invoked by or outside the law.13 In other words, he may argue that corporations can only 
be held consequentially responsible for the wrongs for which others—namely, specific 
individuals—are basically responsible, through the operation of fictions of identification 
or vicarious responsibility. This position would also need to be defended since it is 
unclear what might justify such fictions in light of the traditional criminal law disdain for 
fictions of blameworthiness, and of the possibility that corporate wrongs for which no 
                                                 
13 He seems to recognize the appeal of this other line of argument in some of his recent work. ‘One must be 
basically responsible,’ he writes, ‘or at least assumed to be basically responsible, for the question of one’s 
consequential responsibility to arise in the first place.’ Why use these words? A few paragraphs later, he 
provides the reader with a clue by asking the following: ‘Aren’t there cases in which a fiction of basic 
responsibility may, with moral propriety, be sustained in the law (or in other institutional settings), so that 
the advertised precondition of consequential responsibility may be treated as satisfied when it is really not?’ 
(Gardner 2008, p. 138). 
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distinct individual is blameworthy may then go unaddressed by the criminal law. So there 
is no easy way out for Gardner. In fact, here again, his conception of blameworthiness 
would need to be revised accordingly and, once more, this revision would need to address 
whether excuses and justifications could legitimately be attributed to corporate agents (by 
means of fiction). 
 
If I mention such possible lines of inquiry that transcend somewhat those of the 
book, yet clearly find their roots in it, it is partly to emphasize the further promise of the 
innovative seeds that Gardner has sown therein. This is an important point that both 
critics and reviewers of Offences and Defences tend to make, either explicitly or 
implicitly, when engaging with the rich variety of topics covered in the collection.14 
Thus, while H.L.A. Hart did not contribute much to the philosophy of criminal law after 
the publication of his essays in Punishment and Responsibility, the future of criminal law 
theory is only brighter for the fact that John Gardner’s thought-provoking compilation 
came so early in his career, and that he seems committed to build on this impressive 
effort. 
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